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Argentina's fifty years 
of crisis
— Jim Levy
As if in a recurrent nightm are, the 
A rgentine people seem trapped in an 
unending cycle of disaster. The latest episodes 
followed upon each other with frightening 
alacrity: hum iliation in the M alvinas, the 
forced resignation of General Galtieri, the 
sordid internecine struggle for power in the 
wake of defeat, and failure at M adrid of the 
once w orld-cham pion soccer team . Argentina 
is a com m unity under alm ost unbearable 
pressure in every facet of its existence: a state 
w ithout legitimacy, politicians unable and 
unwilling to establish a workable consensus, 
an econom y in shambles, a military, brutal 
and brutalised apparently  beyond any 
constraints, a civilian population largely 
te r ro r is e d , su b m iss iv e , co n fu sed  and  
demoralised.
To the dispassionate observer, the invasion 
of the M alvinas, whatever the legitimacy of 
A rgentina's claim, might seem quixotic, 
bizarre. In this day, it represents crude 
irredentism , a terribly mistaken adventure to 
achieve sovereignty over some rem ote islands 
sparsely populated with anglophiles in the 
South Atlantic. Those who undertook the 
enterprise staked not only their own careers 
but also the nation 's prestige on an ill- 
conceived, poorly planned m ilitary operation 
which closed off any possibilities of 
diplom atic solution before an intransigent, 
better-arm ed enemy. The u tter failure of the 
military government to  achieve any of its
objectives dem onstrates yet again the 
bankruptcy of its leaders and thus condemns 
Argentina to further political instability, 
economic failure and social conflict.
It is these failures which partly explain why 
the m ilitary decided to abandon negotiations 
over the M alvinas and to invade. Increasing 
pressure from  civilian politicians, organised 
labor, industrialists and the constituency 
formed around "the disappeared" had already 
forced most elements within the armed forces 
to concede the need for a limited political 
opening. M uch of the political pressure 
resulted from m onetarist policies which, in 
the name of liberating "m arket forces" (the 
only liberation known to have occurred in 
Argentina since 1976), have inflicted 
enorm ous dam age upon local industry and its 
e m p lo y e e s . W h ile  th e  e x p o r te r s  o f 
agricultural produce flourished and, with 
them, the traditional oligarchy of estancieros 
(cattle barons), the m ajority of Argentines 
have witnessed a very serious drop in their 
standard of living. Thus, the military which 
pledged in 1976 to end "subversion" and to 
build an econom y capable of sustained 
growth, needed to find popular support in the 
face of its economic failures, or at least to 
deflect its responsibility for them. Now the 
military confronts a much deeper crisis.
Why has this country, endowed with all 
m anner of resources, failed to develop along 
lines followed by A ustralia or Canada? Why
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did social conflict grow to the point where, by 
1974-75, the country was on the brink of civil 
w a r?  W h y  h a v e  d e m o c r a t i c  a n d  
representative institutions so disintegrated 
that the military has intervened at least seven 
times since 1930 and the last elected president 
to complete a full term  in office was Juan  
Peron (1946-52)? Why have the bonds of this 
society so eroded that since 1976 its self- 
a p p o in te d  g u a r d i a n s  " d i s a p p e a r e d "  
somewhere between 6,000 and 15,000 of 
their fellow citizens, m urdered thousands 
more and terrorised many of the rem ainder 
in to  s ile n c e , e x ile , s u b m is s io n  o r 
acquiescence? Is there any connection 
between the crisis over the South Atlantic 
islands and Argentina's past and present 
domestic situation?
The Argentine prob 'em  became manifest in 
1930 w hen th e  a rm y  o v e rth rew  an  
incom petent and corrupt but democratically 
elected constitutional governm ent. The 
justification for arm y intervention sounded 
ominous: the economic and political situation 
demanded strong, idealistic government. The 
military leaders not only found democracy
wanting but also believed that only they 
possessed the abnegation to put the nation's 
interest above personal gain. Elements of 
fascist thought, adm ired within certain 
military circles, surfaced in the rhetoric and, 
to a lesser degree, in the actions of the 
government: the themes of discipline, 
authority , loyalty to th epatria, repudiation of 
liberal values, and rejection of those who 
adhered to them, all came to the fore. 
A lthough this government lasted only little 
more than  a year, it is a precursor. In 1932 a 
fraudulent election produced a governm ent 
whose economic policies and political 
conduct remained faithful to the pre-1930 
norms; outwardly, A rgentina returned to  the 
status quo ante.
Appearances deceive. After 1930, the 
m ilitary became the m ajor political force in 
Argentina, unable to  extract itself from 
politics even when it has wanted to (and this 
desire has surfaced on several occasions). The 
reasons are complex: many officers do believe 
sincerely that the military is the repository of 
selfless patriotism  to defend the nation's 
sovereignty and the Argentine "way of life'' on 
behalf of which life itself may be sacrificed. 
N um erous Argentines accepted this view, at 
least until 1955; it would be a m istake to  deny 
the popularity  of the military.
A t the same time, los que m andan  (those 
who rule), some of whose ranks are filled by 
m ilitary officers, have employed the arm y 
w ithout qualm  to accomplish national tasks
— from  eliminating the indigenous people 
occupying the rich pam pas in the 1880s to  
term inating "subversion", whatever the cost, 
in the late 1970s. Industrialisation also has 
draw n the armed forces deeply into politics. 
They encouraged the grow th of heavy 
industries partly in the name of national 
security during the 1940s; then they m anaged 
them  and profited from  them. Thus, the 
military is as deeply implicated in the nation's 
political and economic failures as the civilians 
they replace. After each attem pt at rule the 
arm ed forces' chiefs emerge divided within 
and obviously as incompetent and venal as 
their civilian predecessors. They are also far 
more brutal.
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The Argentine economic riddle
The economic riddle is why A rgentina has 
grown at such a slow rate since the 1920s. It 
might come as a surprise to Australians to 
know that in 1914 A rgentina enjoyed a per 
capita income higher than that received here. 
Based upon the cultivation and export of 
agricultural produce — wool, wheat, beef — 
A rgentina had achieved a standard of living 
equal to that of Australia on the eve of World 
W ar I. But by the 1920s, from the evidence, it 
is clear that Argentina began to lag behind 
C anada and Australia: both agricultural 
production and exports — the basis of the 
whole economy — dropped off.
At first, the economic collapse of 1930 
rocked Argentina no less than all the other 
com parable countries. In economic policy, 
the governments of the 1930s attem pted to 
restore trade relations by assuring themselves 
of the traditional export m arket (Great 
Britain) via agreements that blatantly  favored 
the export-oriented oligarchy and British 
interests in Argentina. This policy, despite its 
political and social implications, resulted in 
the partial recovery of the export sector and, 
surprisingly, the developm ent of Argentine 
industry. Outwardly, Argentina's economy 
survived the depression well.
But the political and social bonds were 
loosening. At no time prior to or during the 
1930s had the small group which dom inated 
A rgentina seriously addressed the problems 
of social injustice or political fraud, 
corruption and repression. Indeed, the 
A rgentine oligarchy endured  precisely 
because it refused to do so. The development 
of the labor movement was met with 
repression and coercion, sometimes savagely. 
W hat little social legislation emerged from  the 
Congress was simply not enforced. The 
Congress, itself composed of men often 
fraudulently elected, faithfully represented 
the oligarchy which it served. The state 
became little more than a vast patronage 
agency in which interests, as petty as that of 
the jan ito r in need of work and as powerful as 
Royal Dutch Shell in search of concessions, 
were reconciled at the expense of the public. A
gap broadened and deepened between a huge 
mass of the unrepresented and the urban 
middle and upper class consumers unbridged 
by trade unions, but adequate educational 
facilities, by a spirit of compromise, or even 
by noblesse oblige. In such circumstances, 
nationalism  emerged as Argentina's po litica l' 
and social m ortar.
In c reas in g ly  d u rin g  the  1920s, the 
Argentines (with other Latin Americans) 
reacted against the economic and cultural 
hegemony exercised prim arily by Europe, 
and to a lesser extend by the United States. 
British control of the railroads and m eat­
packing (the latter shared with US interests), 
and the great British influence over finance 
and transport (am ong other economic 
activities) constantly reminded Argentines 
that, despite the level o f development, they 
lived in an economic colony. M anufacturing 
industry was precarious. When im ports were 
cut off as occurred between 1914-1918, the 
Argentine economy revealed an extremely 
u n h e a l th y  d e p e n d e n c e  on im p o r te d  
m anufactured goods and on such raw 
materials as coal.
N ationalists advanced the need for greater 
Argentine control over the economy. But 
nationalism  did not react to capital alone; it 
also reacted to the huge num ber of migrants 
who brought their skills, labor, religions and 
lan g u ag es to  A rg e n tin a . N a tio n a lism  
essentially is anti-toreign. Nevertheless, in 
19th century Europe it functioned to  bring 
into the political system the disfranchised 
lower and middle classes thus constituting a 
progressive force. However, in the 20th 
century, nationalism  has worked to frustrate 
that process and to divert energy towards 
constructing ever larger symbolic differences 
between states and other large groups.
Currents of Argentine nationalism
Thus, by 1930, one of the frightening 
currents within Argentine nationalism, 
ascribed to by many of the officers and their 
civilian supporters, was an openly fascistic 
adoration  of an authoritarian , largely self- 
sufficient state. Economically, it meant the
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development of heavy industry and control of 
foreign capital; politically, it involved the 
m aintenance of a m odern well-equipped army 
to protect the state and to advance its 
interests; socially, it required discipline; and 
culturally, it exalted allegedly orthodox 
Christian values (supposedly once dom inant 
in pre-British Argentina) and denigrated 
anything and anyone seen to  deviate from 
these. Thus, pluralism , Jews, communism, 
liberalism, m ost Italians, certainly English 
Protestants and hosts of other people and 
ideas were to be driven from  the temple.
This current within Argentine nationalism  
enjoyed little popular support in 1930, but it 
was to come to  the surface on several 
occasions and is today a very powerful force. 
Its significance, then as now, is that it 
obscures serious economic, political and 
social divisions, and that many powerful 
figures, especially in the military, adhere to it. 
These nationalists, many of whom come from 
the Argentine elite, did not envision in 1930, 
nor do they in 1982, the kind of state in which 
social conflict can at least be attenuated 
through a m ore equitable distribution of 
production and  a more effective participation 
in politics.
The economic requirements determ ined by 
the depression did not perm it economic 
nationalism  in the 1930s. A return to fraud 
and corruption  behind the facade of 
dem ocratic governm ent forestalled the 
im m ediate imposition of authoritarianism . 
Steadfast resistance to claims for social justice 
and continued repression of the labor 
movement substituted for the kind of 
voluntary discipline hoped for by the right; 
culturally, the nationalists made great 
headway.
Even before they emerged trium phant in 
1943, the nationalists managed to establish 
A rgentina's neutrality during the war. In fact, 
neutrality made good economic sense (the 
G erm ans did not torpedo Argentine ships 
carrying food for the British), but it was also a 
victory for the pro-Axis forces and is evidence 
of the increasing influence of rightist, 
au thoritarian  nationalism  within Argentina.
Byzantine politics
The byzantine politics of the years 1943-45 
take their significance prim arily (but not 
exclusively) from the emergence of Juan  
Peron. Before discussing the relationship of 
Peron to  the present situation, however, it 
should be remembered that Argentine 
nationalism  had taken a nasty tu rn  based 
upon an economy losing its dynam ism  and 
within a polity which had forfeited much of its 
legitimacy.
The first Peron era lasted from  1945 to 
1955. During these ten years Peron blended 
the various nationalist themes, and added 
im portant new elements. Above all, he 
provided Argentine nationalism  with a 
profoundly popular base — far too popular to 
the minds of most of the A rgentine oligarchy. 
This was achieved partly through a m ajor 
reorientation of the economy away from  the 
dom inant role played by foreign trade and 
foreign capital to the development of heavy 
industry based upon the m obilisation of 
national capital from private and public 
sources. Peron made agriculture, the 
economic foundation of the oligarchy, pay for 
industry. Sound economic argum ents can be
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a d v a n c e d  in P e ro n 's  defence . A rg e n t in a  was 
fa r  to o  d e p e n d e n t  o n  e x p o r t s  o f  p r im a ry  
p ro d u c ts ;  the  e x p o r t  s ec to r  w as no t 
c o m p e t in g  successfully  w ith  A u s tra l ia  an d  
C a n a d a  (a m o n g  -other n a t io n s  e x p o r t in g  
foo d ) ;  A rg e n t in a  possessed  a d e q u a te  h u m a n  
re so u rces  to  su s ta in  in d u s t r ia l i sa t io n ;  an d  the 
size o f  the  in te rna l  m a r k e t  a l low ed  for  the 
p u rc h a s e  o f  local m a n u fa c tu re s .
Impressive
In fact, the perform ance was impressive at 
least until 1948-49. Then the rot became 
increasingly manifest: poor agricultural 
production or poor trade results or a 
com bination of both (depending on the year) 
caused frequent imbalances of trade and 
payments with the inevitable squeeze on 
fo re ig n  e x c h a n g e . H a v in g  d e c la re d  
A rgentina's economic independence in 1947, 
Peron did not welcome foreign capital, and 
although he was forced to  reconsider this 
policy in 1953, A rgentina now revealed the 
chronic economic difficulties from which it 
continues to suffer: stagflation or boom  or 
bust, but not steady growth. When Peron fell 
in 1955, Argentina was an industrialised 
nation but a t a substantial price paid 
p r im a rily  by the  a g r ic u ltu ra l  sec to r. 
A gricultural production, on which exports 
depended, stagnated or declined. This 
represented a m ajor change in the nation's 
e c o n o m y  a n d  t r a u m a t i c  p o l i t i c a l  
repercussions resulted.
A g a in s t th e  a t ta c k s  o f  p o w e rfu l 
agricultural interests, many of which were 
linked to foreign capital, Peron moved with 
consum m ate skill and speed. To create a 
political force loyal only to himself he 
virtually created, organised and then co­
opted a massive labor movement by granting 
all m anner of economic and political favors. 
In 1943, before he became President, Peron 
began to mobilise the Argentine masses for 
the first time in the nation's history. As 
President, he taught them  tha t the state had 
responsibilities to assure social justice, and 
was rewarded many times until his death in 
1974 with alm ost unquestioned political 
support. Until 1955, with that support he
could take on and defeat most challenges 
thrown up by the oligarchy. But it would be a 
serious error to  believe that Peron merely 
handed out turkeys (or beef steaks) in 
exchange for votes. To the contrary: even 
when the goodies ran out (certainly by 1952 or 
before) he m aintained the loyalty of the 
masses. (Throughout his career Peron 
skilfully m anipulated nationalism  to create a 
half-baked ideology which was easily 
understood and extremely popular.)
Economic nationalism
F ir s t ,  P e ro n  e x p lo i te d  e c o n o m ic  
nationalism. He bought the British-owned 
railroads, declared the nation's independence 
of foreign capital, nationalised activities such 
as telecom m unications, deemed to be 
essential to national security, and employed 
state capital to develop heavy industries some 
of which, like tha t of steel, became enterprises 
owned and run prim arily by the military. Not 
only did the symbols of economic nationalism 
appeal to the masses and to  nationalists of the 
left and the right, but the rapid growth of state 
economic activity in both production and 
services led to an enorm ous increase in people 
economically dependent on the state. These 
enterprises, their employees and their 
suppliers constitute an economic and political 
fact of the greatest im portance in Argentina 
today. Thus, Peron gained additional support 
f ro m  w h ite  c o l la r  b u r e a u c r a ts  an d  
technocrats as well as from  the industrialists. 
The case for the old econom y could be heard 
only within increasingly limited circles, even 
when conditions began to deteriorate.
Political opposition to Peron came from 
elements antagonised by his close association 
with pro-Axis groups before 1944, by his 
participation in the 1930 and 1943 coups and 
opponents concerned about his possible 
dictatorial am bitions. Peron responded to 
these criticisms with consum m ate skill. He 
linked the oligarchy with the old state, 
recalling its decadence, corruption and an ti­
dem ocratic practices. Few could disagree 
with much of his critique. In 1945, he con­
fronted reform ed elements of the corrupt but
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constitutional regime in what many observers 
believe was the m ost honest election in 
Argentina's history. He won, and proceeded 
to open up political participation still further 
by gaining the vote for women in 1947 and by 
encouraging organisations a t the base. He 
attacked the com m unists and favored the 
military thus keeping the support of the 
au thoritarian  nationalists. N ationalism  not 
only gained a popular base but also endowed 
the state with a legitimacy am ong the masses 
it had never before enjoyed.
Peron 's economic policies and political 
strategies found their com plem ent in his 
social program . In a variety of ways — 
including, for example, the acceptance and 
encouragem ent of the labor movement 
(provided that it rem ained loyal to  him), the 
im plem entation of a vast array of welfare 
measures and blatant demagogy — he forged 
a kind of social pact acceptable to the urban 
commercial and industrial bourgeoisie. An 
anathem a to the elite of the ancien regime, 
which also opposed Peron 's economic 
strategy and popular nationalism , this policy 
resulted in vastly heightened economic 
expectations am ong the mass and its 
organisation into a cohesive political
m ovem ent dependent upon and loyal to  one 
man.
The strands within Argentine nationalism , 
which exalted Catholicism, insisted upon 
religious instruction in the public schools, and 
claimed both cultural and racial superiority 
within Latin America, were integrated with 
great subtlety into this populism . Peron never 
proclaim ed the most xenophobic elements of 
Argentine nationalism  — he refrained from  
open anti-Semitism, for exam ple — but he 
went far enough to co-opt substantial 
num bers especially during the good times. 
W ith reference to the present crisis, Peron 
mobilised m uch support within Argentina by 
attem pting to export Peronism  to the areas 
deemed by the Argentines to  be the less 
fortunate countries of Latin America, 
especially to  Bolivia and to Chile.
The whole Peronist edifice contained at 
least two basic weaknesses: it depended on 
one m an, and it rested 'on a weakening 
economic foundation as the agro-export 
sector continued its relative decline, as 
industry dem anded more and m ore capital 
and as the state had to meet its increasing 
economic, political and social obligations. By 
1955, a motley coalition possessed the 
strength to challenge Peron. It included 
elements of the old agro-exporting elite, 
liberal dem ocrats opposed to Peron's 
i n c r e a s i n g l y  d i c t a t o r i a l  m e t h o d s ,  
entrepreneurial elements suffering from  the 
economic crisis, xenophobes angry at Peron's 
backsliding on a variety of issues, and a large 
sector of the bourgeoisie frightened by the 
appearance and influence of organised labor. 
In substantial num bers, both the Church and 
the m ilitary enlisted in the cause. On 
Septem ber 19, 1955, Peron, ra ther than  face 
the prospect of a civil war which could have 
easily become a class war, took  refuge on a 
Paraguayan gunboat anchored in the Rio de 
la P lata , not to set foot again in Argentina 
until 1973.
Traumatic
Peron's decade had been traum atic in at 
least three ways: the m obilisation of the mass;
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industrialisation; and the grow th of the state. 
These facts were irreversible. W hether or not 
the various political forces that now occupied 
the Casa Rosada wished to turn  back the 
clock was irrelevant. They were dealing with a 
new thesis. The u tter and tragic failure of 
A rgentina to achieve an economic, political 
and social m odus vivendi testifies to the depth 
of the problem s left by Peron, deepened still 
further by each day of confusion, inflation, 
corruption , repression and violence.
Initially, the victorious attem pted to 
obliterate Peronist politics, to proscribe 
Peronism — as if such a thing were possible! 
In the attem pt to reassemble H um pty 
D um pty, the new leadership ruthlessly 
censored, imprisoned and ignored the masses 
and even held elections with the intention of 
restoring civilian, dem ocratic governm ent 
disallowing the participation of the Peronists. 
Given all that passed before, how could the 
s ta te  ach ieve  leg itim acy  u n d e r such 
circumstances? W hat possible meaning could 
dem ocracy have? But institutional politics 
constituted only part of the problem.
Economic problems
The structural problem s within the 
econom y continued. Led by the agro­
exporters, many Argentines argued that the 
country ought to return to what made it once 
wealthy: the export of agricultural products. 
Industrialists, directors of state enterprises, 
labor and economic nationalists refused to 
accept this solution. The failure to agree on a 
coherent economic policy has resulted in the 
stop-start pattern , characterised by moments 
of raging inflation and speculation. In the 
m eantim e, foreign capital made impressive 
gains, especially in the industrial sector.
A lthough the economy grew during the 
1960s, it did so unevenly over time and am ong 
sectors. The absence of consensus over 
political and economic directions, combined 
with the form al proscription of the nation's 
largest and most cohesive political force, 
encouraged the proliferation of splinter 
groups and parties from  extrem e right to 
extrem e left. Peron, from  splendid exile in
M adrid, watched as the military intervened in 
1962 and in 1966 to prevent the Peronists 
from returning to power. He also watched the 
military fail to develop or to impose a 
successful economic policy. And he watched 
the people of C ordoba go to the barricades 
against the m ilitary dictatorship in May 1969. 
This revolt dem onstrated dram atically the 
degree to which the nation had become 
fragmented and bitterly divided. Slowly, it 
dawned on some of the m ore sophisticated 
military leaders that there could be no 
consensus w ithout Peron, that the longer they 
remained in power the m ore w dely they 
would be held responsible for th-' situation 
and, not least im portant, that the exercise of 
power was itself dividing the military and 
creating potentially debilitating internal 
conflicts.
Finally, General A lejandro Lanusse, who 
himself had been jailed by Peron, undertook 
to guide A rgentina through the ultimate 
hum iliation — the return to power of Peron 
himself. In a to rtuous political process this 
occurred and, on O ctober 12,1973, the ageing 
general accepted the presidential sash. There 
was not to be a blank cheque, however: 
Lanusse and his colleagues had insisted that 
the growing left, especially the revolutionary 
m arxists and reformists within Peronism, be 
firmly controlled. Indeed, it was almost 
certainly Peron's hope to reconstitute the old 
coalition of industrialists, those dependent on 
the state sector, the co-opted union leadership 
and nationalists wherever they might be 
found — to relive the heady days from 1945 to 
1949. Despite the euphoria, facts would not 
conform. Hum pty D um pty cannot be put 
together again. Immediately the cracks 
appeared.
Organised left
First, by 1974 an organised left existed. 
A lthough small numerically, it attracted the 
frustrated and idealistic am ong professionals 
and students who saw A rgentina's promise 
pass them by. Second, within organised labor, 
an im portant sector had broken with Peron 
and Peronism. M ostly m arxist oriented, this
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sector criticised the corruption, opportunism  
and collaboration of their brothers. It drew 
much numerical strength from  interior 
industrial cities such as Cordoba and 
Rosario. Third, Peronist labor, expecting a 
rerun, established dem ands unacceptable to 
the now powerful industrialists whose 
support of Peron was necessarily conditional 
on his ability to m aintain labor discipline, and 
on an acceptable economic policy. Fourth, 
and perhaps most critical, Peron lacked the 
support of the military.
RELAXING IN PARIS
Even if the old general had not died of heart 
failure on July 1, 1974, the house of cards 
would have caved in. His inability to realise 
the dreams of his followers was obvious from 
the first day of his adm inistration; in fact, his 
left and rightwing followers were already at 
war, a conflict exacerbated by the increasing 
activity of the m arxist guerrilla.
It is this resort to  violence which embodies 
the Argentine tragedy. Given the not 
insignificant achievements of that society, it is 
difficult to explain. A rgentina was not, in 
1975, nor is it now, El Salvador. Those who 
went to war in the streets of Buenos Aires and 
in the hills of Tucum an enjoyed an infinitely
higher standard of living than those who now 
struggle in El Salvador. The miserable in 
A rgentina are proportionately far fewer. The 
space for political debate and for social 
reform was then much greater than in El 
Salvador.
No one can understand A rgentina without 
some com prehension of the strains under 
which the community has lived at least since 
1930 and the bitterness, frustration and anger 
they have bred. The bizarre strands within 
Argentine nationalism  reflect rather than 
reconcile the social divisions; they are 
evidence of the hatred and fear which, 
through nationalism, have gained legitimate 
expression. This occurred in Europe during 
the 1920s and 1930s.
Undeclared civil war
By the time in 1976 that the military 
overthrew Isabel Peron who, as vice- 
president, had succeeded her husband, 
A rgentina was sliding towards civil war in the 
midst of raging inflation. The tenuous bonds 
of society were coming apart in a celebration 
of violence. Declaring a "dirty war" on its own 
citizens, the military unleashed virtually its 
total force on a largely unarm ed and 
unprepared society. The slaughter was 
indiscriminate and prolonged. Unlike the case 
of Chile where the terror was relatively brief 
and guided from a central point, in Argentina 
the central governm ent presided over, but 
often could not control, a violent campaign of 
four years' duration. Any crime, any atrocity, 
could be freely committed because the 
m ilitary had declared war, and in war 
innocents are hurt.
No one knows the exact toll, but the 
estim ates of Amnesty International are 
known, and they refer to those who have 
disappeared. Add to them a large num ber 
who were m urdered. Travellers recently 
re tu rn e d , jo u rn a lis ts  and  A rg en tin es  
themselves all agree that no family remains 
untouched. Yet, in addition to the m urdered, 
the tortured , the maimed and the disappeared 
there exists a society which still hates, and a 
society which still fears; a society which is
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flush with victory and a society which is bitter 
and silent in its defeat and anguish.
The justification for such savagery sounds 
familiar: to eliminate subversion, to  sanitise 
A rgentine politics, to  restore Argentina's 
dem ocratic and Christian(!) heritage, to 
straighten out the economic mess. Indeed, 
that economic mess was worse than  ever as 
A rgentines lost all confidence in the mayhem 
of 1965-76. The m ilitary then turned the 
econom y over to a representative of the agro­
export sector, Jose Alfredo M artinez de Hoz, 
whose function it was to restore the nation's 
grandeur by an explicit and consistent policy 
of favoring agriculture and the export of its 
products a t the expense of the over-protected, 
inefficient and expensive industrial sector. 
T hat m eant lowering tariffs, encouraging the 
investm ent of foreigners, reducing the 
bloated, unproductive state sector. If such 
measures m eant, in turn, unem ploym ent as 
industrial firms closed down, and the anger of 
the industrialists, then so be it. The military 
was determ ined to  establish a consistent 
policy.
M artinez de Hoz did achieve some of his 
goals: thanks to high dem and for the kinds of 
p r o d u c ts  A rg e n t in a  c o u ld  p ro v id e , 
agricultural production increased, prices 
remained high and A rgentina's trade and 
paym ents balances reflected strength. But the 
dom estic economy suffered as industry, 
predictably, underwent a serious crisis (which 
continues to deepen) due to  the rapid surge of 
c h e a p e r  i m p o r t e d  m a n u f a c t u r e s .  
Unem ploym ent appeared and inflation, 
chronic in A rgentina, continued at high rates. 
This is the recipe for social discontent. 
Increasingly, the economy depended on the 
export of agricultural products to the 
European Com m on M arket countries, and to 
its ideological adversary, the USSR.
As might be expected, these policies 
exposed and deepened serious contradictions. 
The support of the agro-export sector and of 
foreign capital antagonised nationalists and 
labor. The problem  was (and is) made 
infinitely m ore complex by the fact tha t most 
of the military consider themselves economic
nationalists fiercely jealous of Argentina's 
industrial base as a m atter of national 
security. Furtherm ore, both  on this ground 
and on the need of patronage, the state-owned 
industrial enterprises were not to be served up 
to the interests of the agro-export elite for the 
sake  o f e ffic iency  an d  c o m p a ra tiv e  
advantage'. Stim ulated by a bloated military 
budget, governm ent deficits continued to 
grow. The political interests within and 
outside Peronism  which reflected the views 
of the economically victimised became 
restive. Econom ic policy emerged as the 
platform  from  which tentative com plaints 
were launched against the exclusion of the 
political parties.
A society in crisis
The m ilitary ju n ta  responded to the 
worsening industrial crisis by once again 
modifying policy and, am ong other measures, 
drastically devalued a cruelly over-valued 
peso thus causing further inflation. The 
reader can detect by now a recurrence of the 
pattern: no m atter how idealistic and resolute 
the military, no degree of force can restore 
Hum pty to his form er self. As General 
Galtieri pondered the options before he (or 
his colleagues) ordered the invasion of the 
M alvinas, he had to  cope with these facts: 1) 
the m ilitary governm ent lacked popular 
support; 2) the politicians exploited this to 
dem and a political opening; 3) the economy, 
or particularly the industrial sector, is in a 
shambles; 4) the parents, relatives and friends 
of the disappeared continue to dem and 
inform ation from  the government; 5) the 
m ilitary is itself deeply divided over the 
proper policies to  solve these (and many 
other) difficulties.
Of all these facts, the economic crisis is 
undoubtedly the m ost serious. Although the 
agricultural sector continues to perform 
adequately, industry is sinking deeper into a 
terrible depression. In 1981, the G D P 
declined 6.1% from  the previous year 
according to official figures, and was only 
2.1% higher than that of 1974. In the last 
quarter of 1981, the G D P was 10.1% lower 
than for the same quarter o f 1980. A private
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research group reported that, during 1981, 
employment was nearly 30% lower than 
during 1974, adm ittedly a boom year. But real 
wages for skilled workers declined by 16% 
and for the unskilled by 18% during 1981. 
Industrial production decreased by over 15% 
during 1981. During the first two m onths of 
1982, vehicle sales fell by 58% over the same 
two m onths of 1981. Inflation continues at a 
rate of well over 100 percent. Under such 
conditions, even the control of subversion, 
now largely accomplished, seems rather 
expensive. The industrialists and labor 
leaders have had enough.
Aware of their growing unpopularity, even 
among sectors willing to go along with 
repression, the military has debated the 
possibilities of opening up governm ent to
acceptable political groups. These debates are 
acrim onious because not all officers of th*, 
armed forces would agree that their mission is 
accomplished, that their dirty war is over. 
M any fear reprisals for atrocities com m itted 
if civilians return to government and many 
fear the loss of privileges or budget cuts.
Given the recent history of Argentina and 
the present situation, the explanation of the 
Falklands or Malvinas policy is perhaps more 
understandable. The nation has been, for the 
last fifty years, under enorm ous pressure as 
d e m o n s t r a te d  by in c r e a s in g  s o c ia l  
disintegration, political failure and the 
legitimisation of a xenophobic nationalism . 
Its fu tu re , b a rr in g  an  u n p re d ic ta b le  
revolution of its basic structures, would 
appear to be tragic.
Visions of a thaw 
in the 
Cold War
— Peter Ormonde
English historian E.P. Thom pson is a m ajor fo rce  in the British and European peace 
movements. His latest book Zero Option, due fo r  Australian release later this year, is a 
collection o f  essays, articles and pam phlets fro m  the last two years. The topics range fro m  
Thompson's analysis o f  international relations, through polemics against conservative 
academics and politicians, to a scathing piece on the recent war in the South A tlantic  — the War 
o f  Thatcher's Face.
The book is published  by the Merlin Press. Below, Peter Ormonde gives an outline o f  
Thom pson's ideas on disarmament and politics.
